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Lord Mustill and the Channel Tunnel Case 
 
William W. Park, Professor of Law, Boston University   
 
The arbitration world lost a giant when Michael Mustill departed in April of this year, just a few 
days short of his eighty-fourth birthday.  A man of enormous intellect and wit, with a fine capacity 
for sincere friendship, this generous Yorkshireman enriched us through contributions as counsel,  
judge, scholar and mentor.   
Lord Mustill sat as judge successively in the High Court of London, the English Court of Appeal 
and the UK House of Lords, the last of which morphed into the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom.  After retirement from the bench, his service as arbitrator touched a wide spectrum of 
disputes, implicating expertise in both private and public law.  His treatise on commercial 
arbitration shines for a robust analysis of arbitration law,1 as does the innovative and seriously 
brilliant exploration of what the “new lex mercatoria” might (or might not) comprise.2  He served 
his alma mater, Cambridge, as Arthur Goodhart Professor, Fellow of St. John’s College, and 
Honorary President of the Cambridge University Law Society.    
Among his judicial pronouncements in the field of international arbitration, several will be “worth a 
detour” as the Michelin Guide says of an exceptionally good gourmet restaurant.  In this connection, 
we might stop to consider the House of Lords decision in the Channel Tunnel case,3 for which Lord 
Mustill delivered a majority speech addressing the vexing question of when and how courts in one 
country should play a part in overseas arbitrations. 
The case finds its genesis in the body of water separating England and France, known as La Manche 
in the language of Molière and the English Channel for those partial to the language of Shakespeare.  
Connecting the Atlantic Ocean to the North Sea, these waters historically provided the British with 
enhanced protection against military invasion, albeit at a cost to efficient commerce with the 
Continent.   
In 1988, after extensive debate, the governments of France and Britain agreed to construct a 
monumental tunnel of 31 miles (50 kilometers) joining the two countries.  The parties to the 
construction contract designed an elaborately bespoke dispute resolution mechanism, calling for 
ICC arbitration in Belgium and designating not one, nor two, but three different legal systems to 
govern the relationship.  The arbitrators were to apply “principles common to both English law and 
French law.”  Absent such common principles, the agreement was to be construed according to 
                                                 
1 MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWARD C. BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d Edition 1989; 
updated Companion Volume 2001). 
2  Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, 4 ARBITRATION 
INTERNATIONAL 86 (1988), adjusted with amendments from LIBER AMICORUM FOR LORD 
WILBERFORCE, Oxford University Press (1987). 
3 Channel Group v Balfour Beatty Ltd. [1993] Adj.L.R. 01/21. 
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“general principles of international trade law as have been applied by national and international 
tribunals.”4  
As might be expected in a project of this scope, differences of opinion arose between the 
concessionaire and the construction companies.  The contractors contended that changes in the 
nature of their tasks made the original price inadequate, and threatened to stop work if not properly 
paid.  
The concessionaire sought judicial relief outside the arbitral process, asking English courts to 
restrain the contractors from suspending work pending resolution of the dispute.  Ultimately the 
matter reached the House of Lords.  Although admitting that an English court had power to grant an 
injunction, Mustill reasoned that such power should not be exercised under the circumstances of the 
case.  Noting the heavily-negotiated arbitration and choice-of-law provisions, rather than a routine 
standard-form clause, he wrote as follows.5 
The parties chose an indeterminate “law” to govern their substantive rights; an elaborate 
process for ascertaining those rights; and a location for that process outside the territories of 
the participants. This conspicuously neutral “anational” and extra-judicial structure may well 
have been the right choice for the special needs of the Channel Tunnel venture. But whether 
it was right or wrong, it is the choice which the parties have made. The appellants now 
regret that choice. …. Notwithstanding that the court can and should in the right case 
provide reinforcement for the arbitral process by granting interim relief I am quite satisfied 
that this is not such a case and that to order an injunction here would be to act contrary both 
to the general tenor of the construction contract and to the spirit of international arbitration.6 
 
One can only imagine the dilemma facing Lord Mustill.  In the dynamics of construction projects, 
little causes more harm than work stoppage.  The potential damage to tunnel progress would have 
provided a strong argument for directing work to continue uninterrupted.  A good judge, however, 
                                                 
4 Clauses 67 and 68, Construction Contract dated 13 August 1986, cited at paragraphs 26-28 of 
Lord Mustill’s speech. 
5 Paragraph 100 of Lord Mustill’s speech.  When the case was decided, the relevant issues were 
governed by the Arbitration Acts of 1950 and 1975.  Later the 1996 Arbitration Act adopted Section 
2(4), providing that “[t]he court may exercise a power conferred by any provision of this Part …for 
the purpose of supporting the arbitral process where (a) no seat of the arbitration has been 
designated or determined, and (b) by reason of a connection with England and Wales or Northern 
Ireland the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so.”   
6  One notes the delicate and diplomatic ambiguity of the reference to the arbitral seat: “whether 
right or wrong, it is the choice the parties have made.”  At the time, arbitration law in Belgium was 
controversial and misunderstood, due to an experiment with a form of delocalization that precluded 
annulment of procedurally defective awards if, as in the Channel Tunnel case, the parties came from 
outside Belgium. As in force between 1985 and 1998, Belgian Code Judiciaire Article 1717(4) 
provided, “Les tribunaux belges ne peuvent connaître d’une demande en annulation que lorsqu’au 
moins une partie au différend tranché par la sentence arbitrale est soit une personne physique ayant 
la nationalité belge ou une résidence en Belgique, soit une personne morale constituée en Belgique 
ou y ayant une succursale ou un siège quelconque d’opération.”  Annulment, of course, presents a 
different issue from pre-award judicial support for the arbitral process. 
will carefully analyze the interaction between judicial power and the arbitration framework chosen 
by sophisticated parties with access to competent counsel.  
 
Any reminiscence of such a great man should include a personal vignette.  During one of Michael’s 
visits to Boston we took in a baseball game together.  The Red Sox, our local team, were playing 
their sworn rivals, the New York Yankees.  Michael revealed that during his army service he 
sometimes narrated baseball games for American troops stationed in England.  Then with 
frightening precision he imitated noises for a host of plays:  the whoosh of an infield fly ball before 
being caught by the second baseman; the thud of a slow runner tagged while trying to slide into 
third; and the smack of a home run hit by a right-handed batter on its way to clearing the left-field 
wall at Fenway Park.  Enough to cause envy in the best radio sound effects man.  
Michael Mustill will be missed. 
Rusty Park, Boston University 
Forthcoming, 31 Arbitration International (2015) Michael Mustill and the Channel Tunnel Case, 31 
ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming, Issue 3, 2015); adapted in 47 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE 
ARBITRAGEM (Comitê Brasileiro de Arbitragem) (July/September 2015). 
 
 
